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l. Councils for the Judiciary in focus
In various European countries Councils for the Judiciary -called 'Councils for
the Judiciary' or 'Council for the Magistralure'- exist. These instilutions generally
function äs intermcdiarics between government and the Judiciary in order to guaran-
tee the independence of the Judiciary in some way or in some respect. Councils for
the Judiciary have different competences in different EU countries. Some of them act
äs boards for the appointment of judges and disciplinary action against judges (e.g.
France and Italy), other administration authorities play an active role in the budget-
ing and general (Financial and administrative) management of Courts, äs well äs
housing, education, computerisation etc. (e.g. Sweden and Denmark).
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AI present there seems lo be an European trend to establish Councils for the Ju-
diciaty in countries thal hitherto relied on ministerial management and budgeting of
the Courts and the judiciary. This shift has lead to the establishment of Councils for
the Judiciary in Ireland (1998) and Denmark (1999). The Netherlands only recently
estabiished -effectively since l january 2002- a Council for the Judiciary (Council
for the Administration of Justice) of their own1. This contribution reports on some of
the characteristics of various European Councils for the Judiciary. I will especially
highlight the issue of public or constitutional responsibility for the management of
the judiciary in EU countries that work with a Council for the Judiciary and the coun-
tries lhat are considering to establish one. In most EU countries that do not have a
Council for the Judiciary the public responsibility for the management of the
judiciary itself was, until recently, mainly expressed via and governed by Ministerial
responsibility of a Minister of Justice (or of the Government) to Parliamenl. A
Council for the Judiciary brings about changes in the former pattern of responsibility-
arrangements. It causcs shifts in the constitutional balance of power.
The research reported on here was originally commissioned by the Dutch Govern-
ment. In ] 998 the Dutch Minister of Justice wanted a comparative study into the position
and functioning of different European Councils for the Judiciary äs an Inspiration for and
reflection on their own plans to establish a Dutch Council for the Judiciary. This contri-
bution summarizes some of the most interesting elements of the Dutch rcport2. The
Dutch plans and the subsequent establishment of the Dutch Council for the Judiciary in
2002 are the stage behind the analyses and some of the conclusions in this contribution.
2. Northern and Southern European model of Councils for the Judiciary
Although every Council for the Judiciary is the unique product of a specific devel-
opment within a legal culture, some general distinctions can bc madc among the different
Councils in Europc. Some Councils are estabiished according to, what we can call,
the Southern European model of Councils for the Judiciary. Southern European Coun-
cils for the Judiciary are mostly constitutionally rooted and fulfil some primary func-
tions in the safeguarding of judicial independence. These functions typically include ao-
vice äs regards the appointmcnt or promotion of members of the judiciary, or t β
exercisc of the power of appointmcnt of promotion by the Council itself, the training
and the exercisc of disciplinary powers with regard to members of the judiciary. ^
responsibilities and competences of Councils for the Judiciary set up according to
Southern European model are all have to do with carecr decisions of (individual) judge .
Councils for the Judiciary fit out according to the North European model o
have distinctly different characteristics. In most cases these latter Councils ratne
1
 Wct van 6 december 2001 tot wij/iging van de Wet op de rechtcrlijke organisatie, de Wet
rechlerlijkc amblenaren en enkele andere wetten in verband inet de instelling van de Raad voor de rechtspraa
Raad voor de rechtspraak), (Ad cstablishing the Council for the Judiciary) Slb. (Official Journal) 2001, 5Ki.
2
 See W. VObRMANS and P. ALBERS, Veruntwoordäijkheid voor de rechispleging; een Rechtsvers J ^
onderzoek naarde positle van de rüden voor de rechtspraak in landen van de Kuwpesc U nie, Mimstry of Jus ι ,
Haguel999.
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possess competences in the area of court administration (supervision of judicial ad-
ministrations, management of case loads and case Stocks, Strategie planning, flow
rates, promotion of legal uniformity, quality care etc.), court management (think of
housing, automation, recruitment, training, etc.) and the budgeting of courts (in-
volvement in setting the budget, distribution and allocation, supervision and control
of the expenditure, etc.). The responsibilities and competences of Councils for the
Judiciary set up according to the Northern European model are not primarily fo-
cussed at the careers of judges but rather on the -effective and efficient- manage-
ment of judicial organisations.
A) Councils according the Southern European model
Examples of Councils for the Judiciary fitted out according to the Southern Eu-
ropean model are to be found in France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Belgium.
In France a High Council for the Magistrature (Conseil superieur de la magis-
trature) hast existed since 1946. The President of the Republic chairs this Council. In
addition, the Conseil consists of the Minister of Justice (Vice-Chairman), twelve
members who are appointed for a four-year term by and from the ranks of the judi-
cial organisations themselves and the Public Prosecutor's Office. In addition, one
member of the CSM is elected by the Conseil d'Etat (Council of State), one is ap-
pointed by the President of the Republic and one is appointed by the President of the
Assemblee nationale (the French Parliament) three members appointed by the Head
of Satate. The Conseil has competences in the domain of the appointment of mem-
bers of the Judiciary -members of the Judiciary are appointed by or on recommenda-
üon of the Conseil by the French President- disciplinary judicial procedure and pro-
motion of members of the Judiciary.
Italy also has a High Council for the magislrature (Consiglio Superiore della
Magistratura). This Council is closely related to the French Conseil Superieur de l a
Magistrature and is also chaired by the Head of State. It consists of the First Chair-
man of the Suprcme Court of Appeal, the Attorney General with this Court, twenty
members appointed by and from the judicial Organisation and ten qualified jurists
chosen by Parliament. The competences of the Council embrace appointment, trans-
fer and promotion of the members of the Judiciary, the appointment of other persons
who are serving on Courts of justice of the ordinary Judiciary, and disciplinary judi-
cial procedure with regard to the members of the Judiciary.
In Spain a General Council functions for the Judiciary (el Consejo General del
Poder Judicial). This consists of the president of the Tribunal Supremo (chairman)
and of twenty members appointed, on the recommendation of Parliament, for a period
of five years by the Head of State. Twelve of them come from the circles of theju-
diciary and eight from lhat of barristers, solicitors and other jurists. The competences
of the Consejo concern appointments, training, promotion and supervision via
inspection and disciplinary judicial procedure.
Another example of a High Council for the magistrature according to the South-
ern European model is to be found in Portugal. There the president of the Supreme
2136 THE SPANISH CONSTITUTION IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Court chairs the so-called Conselho Superior da Magistratura. Furthermore, it
consists of sixteen ordinary members, two of whom are appointed by the Head of
State, seven by Parliament and seven by and from the judicial Organisation. Like in
Spam, the public prosecution is not part of the Portuguese Council. The competences
of the Council include appointments, posting/transferring and promotion of judges.
Belgium only recently established a Council for the Judiciary3. Since Jury 1999
the Möge Raad voor de Justitie (High Court of Justice) is responsible for the deter-
mination of Job descriptions for magistrate functions, the development of judicial
quality Standards and criteria, judicial training and the development of training pro-
gramme's, the issuing of recommendations on judicial appointments, including the
posting/transferring and promotion of judges, the supervision of courts and the ad-
dressing of complaints. Disciplinary proceedings are not conducted by the High
Court itself, but the Court is responsible for the instruction of disciplinary cases and
the preliminary hearings. The Belgian High Court consists of forty four magistrates.
They are recruited from and elected by the different Belgian Courts and Magistrates
echelons. The Court has a Flemisri division (with twenty-two members) and a French
division (also with twenty two members)
B) Councils according the Northern European model
At present, examples of countries where a Council for the Judiciary functions,
sei up in accordance with the Northern European model, are Sweden, Ireland, Den·
mark and the Netherlands.
The 'fatherhood' for a Council for the Judiciary in accordance with the Northern
European model remains with the Kingdom of Sweden. In Sweden the so-calleil
^ Domstolsverket' exists since 1975. This Council for the Judiciary is set up äs an 1°'
dependent administrative body led by a director-general. The executive of the Coun~
eil is under his chairmanship and further consists of four judges (two Court presl
dents and two presidents of Courts of appeal), two members of Parliament, a lawy6
and two union representatives. The competences of the Swedish Council for the J
diciary consist of, among other, administrative tasks with regard to the drafting 011
budget and the apportionment of the national budget for the Judiciary among the Ja
courts, and further the execution of managerial competences such äs supporting
law-courts in, among other things, the area of personnel and training managenie >
housing, automation and computerisation (business administration Systems, jur
prudence databascs, and suchlike), administrative Organisation and bearing
responsibility for accounting information concerning the spending o
In addition to this, the Council principally fulfils regarding the recruitment
appointments4 of judges.
ic
3
 Established by Wet van 22 Dccember 1998 toi wijziging van sommigc bepalingen van deei
 aten
Gerechte!ijk Wetboek met betrckking tot de Möge Raad voor de Justitie, de benoeming en aanwijzing van m< b
en tot invoering van cen cvaluaticsysteem (BS 2/2/1999). .
 sjnde-
4
 The bureau ofofficc support for the Appointments Review Commiltee for the Judiciary that func i
pendently from the Domstolsverket. See Appointment of permanent judges and the position oj tne 11
Review Commitleefor the Judiciary and its working method, published by Domstolsverket, Jönkopmg
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Ever since 16lh April 19985 Ireland also has a Council for the Judiciary (Courts
Service)6. The Council is under the chairmanship of a Chief Executive Officer (ap-
pointed on Ist January 1999) and is further made up of nine judicial members from
the different ranks of the judicial instances in Ireland, the Attorney General, two law-
yers, members from the echelons of the administrative and legal staff of the judiciary
(clerks office, registrar, etc.), a public prosecutor/district attorney, a member repre-
senting the interests of the clientele of the law-courts, a member designated by united
unions and a juridical expert. The Council has a number of tasks and competences in
the area of the administration and management of law-courts, including apportioning
of the budget, inspection on and justification of spending of the budget funds by the
law-courts, the general administrative assistance to law-courts, supporting depart-
ments for judges (including the auxiliary personnel), external relations (among other
things public Information), responsibility for housing, taking care of facilities for
clients of the judicial procedure, training programmes, provision of Information and
responsibility concerning data relating to the working process of the law-courts,
providing annual reports and Strategie policy plans and -more in general- advising
the Minister of Justice in the domain of the judicial procedure.
Denmark also only quite recently (26th June 1998) voted a Law on the Council
for the Judiciary (Lov om Domstolsstyreisen), by which, inspired by the Swedish ex-
ample, an independent Council for the Judiciary is being set up. The Council for the
Judiciary functions from its coming into Operation on Ist July 1999 in Denmark. The
Council is under the chairmanship of a director and board of five -independent-
committee members from the different judicial instances (Supreme Court, High
Court and Town Courts) two committee members from the circles of the juridical
staff of the law-courts, and two from the supporting departments. Furthermore, a
lawyer and two committee members with management-expertise will have a seat in
the board of the Council. The director and the daily administration do not have any
independent competences, which they could exercise independently from the general
executive of the Council. The Council, in addition to supporting tasks for the Juridi-
cal Appointments Council (a separate body), has competences in the domain of the
budget (among other things making budget proposals to the Minister of Justice) and
the competence, should the occasion arise, to address Parliament directly if the
Council considers the allocated means to be insufficient). In addition to this the
Council has the authority to set up Strategie policy plans for the judicial procedure,
the authority to apportionate the budget funds among the law-courts, to inspect the
spending, the responsibility of drawing up annual reports and annual Statements of
accounts, and a general competences in the area of the management of the courts
(varying from housing, and accounting to the training of the staff). In addition to this,
the Council will play a supporting role in providing Information and in automation.
In the Netherlands a Council for the judiciary was established on l January
20027. The Council -a Northern European-modelled one- has modest sized board
Dalc of Implementation of the Couits Service Act, 1998.
In Gaclic the Council is called 'An tSeirbhis Chüirteanna'.
See footnotc 2.
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consisting of five members8, Ihree ofthem judges9. The Council performs a number
of policy making duties (external affairs and public Services, judicial collaboration,
personnel management and appointment policy, recruting, Professional training, ap-
pointments, advice to the Minister of Justice and policy on quality) and manage-
menl-related duties (housing and safety, automation, administrative organization and
providing administrative information)10. Furthermore the Council plays an imporlant
role in the area of the budget procedure and the distribution of the means for the ad-
ministration of justice äs well äs the supervision of the expenditure thereof. With
these competences, the Council for the judiciary becomes a double-edged sword: on
the one hand it encourages the independence -in the organizational sense- of the ju-
diciary and on the other hand it expands the seif-responsibility and accountability of
the judiciary in the arca of administration, management and budgeting. The manage-
ment-related, policymaking and budgetary competences that are assigned to the
Council for the judiciary, formely largely belongcd to the responsibility of the Minis-
ter of Justice. In this sense the establishment of the Council in 2002 constituted quite
a radical break with the past. The Council does not have a lot legal powers vLs-ä-vis
the courts or individual judges. The core of the legal competences of the Council is
related to the budgetary cycle (distribution of funds and supervision) and the recruit-
ment and appointment of personnel. It's main management Instrument, however, to
implement it's policies is the Instrument known äs: 'management by spcech'. The
Council is still very young, and it is too early to draw any conclusions. What is
intcresting is that the Council in it's first year of existence especially focussed on
developing a policy to safeguard the quality of the administration of justice".
3. Learning frora the experienccs with other European Councils for the
Judiciary?
Councils for the Judiciary are the product of various political and cultural de
velopments within a legal System, that in turn is dceply rooted in the historical, cu -
tural and social development of the country involved. Because ofthat, every Counc
for the Judiciary is unique and we can not sec or compare these institutions out
their context. The question thus äs to whether for example the Dutch governnie
-when considering to establish a council in 1999- could learn something fr°m
examples of and experiences with Councils for the Judiciary in other legal syste >
was a tedious question in morc than one respect. In any case, it is a fact that the
amples of other countries do not lend themselves to direct transfer. The exPerl?nter.
that other countries have had with Councils for the Judiciary, are very much
mined by the specific social and constitutional context of a country and the cu ^
development that such a country has gone through. Evcry System has found i
balance, via specific 'checks and balanccs'. To be able to estimate the value an
Gurrently presidccl by mr Λ H vanücldcn
Arlicle 84 of the Aot estabhshmg the Council lor the Judiciary
ArtiUc91 of the Acteslabhshmgthe Council lor the Judiciary
One of the rcsult is the Implementation of a systcm and procedure for citi/en-complaints
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nificance of a System from outside its own borders a broad knowledge of the Situa-
tion and history is required. In many respects the balance between the constitutional
guarantees for independent jurisdiction and independent Courts and the forms of
public control of the same jurisdiction are closely interwoven.
Discussions and developments abroad can contain important experience-related
Information and arguments that can be of value for Systems that are contemplating a
Council for the judiciary. Below, I made a brief inventory of matters and experiences
that struck me when I was describing the Council for the Judiciary. These remarks
can be significant äs confrontation experiences for actual or future discussions in Eu-
ropean countries -especially the new EU-member states- on the concept, signifi-
cance and organization of a Council for the Judiciary within a constitutional frame-
work.
4. The emergence of Councils for the Judiciary in Europe
The most remarkable aspect in the country studies made in the research is that at
present in three countries (Ireland, Denmark, and the Netherlands), new Councils for
the Judiciary were recently established. In Ireland, that already happened in 1998, in
Denmark the establishment of the provisional Council for the Judiciary came about
in 1999, and in the Netherlands a Council for the judiciary was established on l January
2002. This simultaneous advent rests not entirely on coincidence. First of all -cer-
tainly in Denmark- the model of the Swedish Domstolsverket and the good expe-
riences they had, have been a source of Inspiration. In addition to this, there are also
the recommendations that Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe made in
1994 within the framework of Article 6 EVRM -concerning the judicial indepen-
dence, the role of judges and the appropriateness of the administration of justice-
that play a role12. These recommendations do not require that a country calls an inde-
pendent board into being, for the guarantee of the independence of the jurisdiction,
but they do demand, for example, that the appointment of judges takes place inde-
pendently and that judicial organization in any sort of way can exert influence on
their own working process. These recommendations have thus partially been the
catalyst. In all three countries (the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland) a Situation first
existed in which the management and the support of the judiciary was entrusted to
the Ministers of Justice. From the viewpoint of guaranteeing the judicial indepen-
dence -äs it appears from the Swedish experience- it is considered äs important that
the management and the support of the management take place at a distance. In the
Danish, the Irish and the Dutch plans this is described äs an imporlant advantage for
an independent Council for the Judiciary. The resistance against the Swedish
Government's plans at the Start of the 1990s, to return certain managerial competences
of the Domstolsverket to the responsibility of the Government, illustrates that, also
12
 Recoinmendation on the 'independence, efficiency and role ojjudgei,, Rccommcndation No. R (94) adopted
by the Commiltec of Ministers on 13th Octobcr al the 578th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies.
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after some time, putting these duties at a distance is still viewed upon äs an important
guarantee.
5. New Councils for the Judiciary based on the North European model
Not only is the advent of independent Council for the Judiciary new, the pack-
age of responsibilities that they have is remarkable. In the Netherlands, äs well äs in
Denmark and Ireland, it was decided to entrust the new Council for the Judiciary
with managerial and Support tasks (varying from training, accommodation, automa-
tion, providing Information, help with recruitment and assistance to Appointment
advisory committees) and competences in the area of budget, apportionment of the
budgets and justification of spending. Thus not only are increasingly more Councils
for the Judiciary created in Europe, the newcomers are all variants of the North Euro-
pean model. Certainly to some extent this is due to the success of the Swedish Coun-
cil and the example it presents. Through leaving managerial competences and -cer-
tain- budget responsibilities to a judicial organization the seif responsibility for the
management of judicial bodies can be extended and with it the efficiency. In Sweden
it is stated thal indeed this seif responsibility of the judicial organization in its entire-
ty has increased by the way the Domstolsverket functions within the Swedish sys-
tem. The cause of this greater seif responsibility -äs we can see in Sweden- is to be
found in the presence of a Professional and specific organization responsible for the
judicial management and budget affairs that acts äs a buffer betwcen the judicial or-
ganization and the Government. This buffer is equally an ally and a guard dog.
A second cause of the larger seif responsibility in Sweden lies hidden in tne
combinaüon of independenl administration, management andbudgeting of the judi-
cial organization by the Domstolsverket together with integral management at the
level of the Courts. For their operational management the Courts are very much lei
to their own devices. The Domstolsverket promotes, coaches and to a certain exte
supervises this administrative seif responsibility of the Courts. Also in the Netner
lands one has opted for this proved -at least in Sweden- combination of rem°t
management and integral management. In any case, in Sweden they are strong y
attached to this combination.
6. Contributions to the quality of the administration of justice
Councils for the Judiciary contribute to the quality and the effectiveness pi
(system of the) administration of justice, according to thosc who were intervi
within the framework of this study. The Northern and the Southern European n i o ^
actually express two principal methods to further the quality of a system of ad
tration of justice.
In the Southern European model this quality contribution takes place prt ^e
via a system of judicial responsibility for quality that addresses the Pers^ iyOn
judge and his career. With the accent exerted in countries such äs France an
WIMVOERMANS 2141
recruitment, training, evaluation, appointment, promotion and posting, via the per-
son of the judge during his or her entire judicial career, the quality of justice adminis-
tration is monitored by promoting and controlling the quality of the independent
judge. This control is carried out by judges themselves. Via a role in disciplinary
penalties the Southern European Systems also have the possibility not only to reward
but also to reprimand.
The promotion and monitoring of the quality of administration of justice in Sys-
tems that work with the Northern European Council, the approach usually lies not äs
much in the control on judges but moreover in the material and managerial area. Via
the Council for the Judiciary the attention is constantly kept on the needs of the judi-
cial organizations, without the distorting influence of the Government. By being able
to take care of direct material needs, to Support and to have a central Information cen-
tre, the Northern European Councils try to reach the highest possible quality of judi-
cial Services by effective management and efficient administration. Through the in-
creased efficiency of judicial Services one tries to increase the quality of the
administration of justice.
7. Promotion of the independence
An imporlant incentive for establishing a Council for the Judiciary in just about
all the investigated countries is the promotion of the independence of the Judiciary.
This independence and independent Status of the Judiciary is not the same in all
countries. In France the Judiciary does not have a very high Status, while in Italy the
independence of the Judiciary receives a special Status: there the Judiciary, precisely
due to problems concerning the independence of judges in the (recent) past, has a
special prestige. According to the respondents in this study, in Italy the Council for
the Judiciary contributes more to the preservation than to the promotion of the inde-
pendence. The favourable effect of Councils for the Judiciary, whether they are
based on the Northern or the Southern European model, on the independent Status of
judges and judicial organizations manifests itself in all the investigated countries.
8. Constitutional basis
Another detail in most of the investigated countries is (the wish for) the constitu-
tional basis of a Council for the Judiciary. In France and Italy the competence and the
Position of the Council for the Judiciary are regulaled by the Constitution. In the
Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark there is the intention to do that. The wish for con-
stitutional establishment is normal: a Council for the Judiciary is an important Insti-
tution that assumes an own role in the constitutional distribution of the State powers.
The main aspects of the distribution of the competences and positions of the most
important State powers in a country having a written constitution should be regulated
in the Constitution.
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9. Broadly composed boards of the Councils for the Judiciary
Nearly all the investigated Councils for the Judiciary -with the exception of the
Dutctl·- are broadly composed with boards of 15 or more members. The majority of
the council boards are composed mainly of judges coming from the differenl sec-
tions of the Judiciary. Some -mainly the highest- judges are,, by virtue of their of-
fice, member of a Council for the Judiciary, other judges are elected by judges frorn
the different judicial ranks. In France and in Italy the President and Minister of Jus-
tice are 'qualitate qua' members of the board. Differences exist in the non-judicial
part of the board, i.e. the part of the board with members that are not judges by pro-
fession. Usually these 'lay'-members" are elected in all sorts of ways by groups of
interested parties at the level of the Court Staffs14, Labour Unions and/or by Parlia-
ment. The broad and representative composition of Councils for the Judiciary in
most countries makes it, inprinciple, susceptible to politicisation and syndicalism. In
different times the correct balance and the correct relationship between the denomi-
nations of the board members can be seen differently or lie otherwise. In order to re-
tain the balance in the vote ratio within the Council for the Judiciary two Systems
exist: first, that of the appointment requirements (only members who satisfy certain
requirements of professionalism and representatively qualities .can be appointed);
secondly, the System of spreading appointment authorities (appointment by Parha-
mcnt, by Government or again by others). The latter System is vulnerable in that that
it can cause, for example, a Council for the Judiciary unintentionally to consist only
of judges because, for example, Parliament only wished to appoint judges. In order
to avoid this risk, most investigated Systems contained a combination of both ap-
poinlment Systems.
10. 'External' members in the boards of the Councils
The foreign Councils for the Judiciary, such äs those discussed here, share
tically without exception the element of the 'layman' or non-judge-mcmbers, W
have a seat in the board of the Council (further: external members). The cxamp'68
France and Swedcn show that in both countries the votc of, for example, lawye '
clients and unions in the boards the Council for the Judiciary is valued. Also
Dcnmark and Ireland one has optcd for external members on the board of the ne
established Councils. Via the contribution of external members an element of soc
control is introduced with regard to the work of the Council for the Judiciary. I*1l
of the countries however the juridical/magistrates-contingent within the Counc
the Judiciary always rnake up the majority. The prescnce of external members
Council for the Judiciary can indeed give rise to much discussion, such äs the j
ple of France shows. External members can 'polilicise' the boards of the Co
n
 Thcy are not exactly lay-mcmbers m the sensc that they are not lawyers most ol'the Urne; mo
thcse 'lay-mcmbers' in fact are lawyers, but notjudgcs or magistrates
" E g Court Clerks
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which constitutes a threat to the judicial independence. In France and Italy, problems
around the politicisation or the syndicalisation through judicial appointments tend to
be attenuated via the proportions in the board for the magistrature, äs appears from
the proposed amendments with regard lo the composition of the Council for the Judi-
ciary in bolh countries. In fact, with this the problem of politicisation and syndicali-
sation is only confirmed, not actually solved.
11. The combined action of public control and the role of the ministerial
responsibility
The legal Systems described in this study, within which Councils for the Judicia-
ry function, consist of different mixtures of constitutional Instruments of checks and
balances, among which the control via the ministerial responsibility is usually only
one of the Instruments. Compared with France and Sweden the way in which, via the
ministerial responsibility, control until recently (2002) was exerted on the manage-
ment and the budgeting of the judiciary in the Netherlands -at least in theory- is
very intrusive. In the Dutch discussions up until 1999 on more independence of the
judiciary by way of establishing a Council for the Judiciary ministerial responsibility
was perceived by some äs the pre-eminent Instrument of control on the functioning
of the judiciary. The question is, however, if the ministerial responsibility äs amech-
anism of control with regard to the budgeting and the managemcnt of Courts is in-
deed always such an effective Instrument. That management and the budgeting of
Courts is hardly a current political theme in most of the studied countries. The focus
of the political discussion between Government and Parliament is in most cases
more conccrned with the area of maintaining the law and prosecution of crimes. That
also means that the ministerial responsibility äs an Instrument of control must not be
overrated. The examples from other countries make it clear that, even if there is talk
of an enlirely different, less intrusive, control on the budgeting and the management
of the judicial organizations via the ministerial control, effective public control on
the judiciary is till possible. Examples in other European countries show that in fact
there are different alternative and effective mechanisms of control, such äs publicity,
official control, legal protection or the supervision and control by a Council for the
Judiciary that can effecüvely control the way in which Courts function.
12. Epilogue
Comparative legal research is äs much fun äs it is complicated. One the one
hand it is interesting to visit and study different legal Systems and analyse them on
the other hand it is very difficult to 'extrapolate' the analysis of a System and to draw
conclusions that bear significance for another System. Legal phcnomena most of the
time are rooted to deeply in the distincl legal and cultural developments to be able to
be exported without further qucstioning. Fortunately for this research prqject the
Dutch plans to establish a Council for the Judiciary was not dependent on this re-
search project into other European Councils. The research results only were an inspi-
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ration and Instruments to fine-tune the Dutch proposals. Ever since l January 2002
the Duth have their own Council for the judiciary. It will be interesting to see how
it develops and what experiences result from it. Maybe in it's turn the Ducht
experiences may provide an Inspiration for other European Countries considering to
establish a Council for the Judiciary.
